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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
HOMER HANSEN (HANSON),
Plaintif!-Appellant,
vs.
ASSOCIATES FINANCE,
INC., and UTAH
COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.

12556

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant claims that he purchased real
property that contained various pieces of radio
equipment. He claims the radio equipment was
attached to the realty and that the respondents came
upon his property and removed the equipment. The
appellant seems to premise his claim to a greater
legal and possessory interest in the equipment upon
the basis of being a bona fide purchaser of the realty
for value. The original lessee of the equipment failed
to make his payments and the respondents reclaimed
their property.
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DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
At the trial in the Third District Court of Salt
Lake County, before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, on the 13th day of May, 1971, the Court determined from all the evidence produced that the appellant was sufficiently informed of respondents' interest in the radio equipment to put the appellant on
notice of that interest. The Court further found that
the radio equipment was not a part of the real property and that appellant was not a bona fide purchaser of said equipment for value. The Court also found
that if in fact there was a trespass the appellant suffered no damage as a result thereof nor was such
purported trespass of a willful nature. The Court
then concluded that there existed no cause of action
against either respondent and dismissed the action
with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents contend that the Lower Court having all the evidence before it, properly applied the
law to that evidence and found that no cause of action
existed. Respondents would ask this Court to uphold
the Lower Court's judgment of dismissal and award
to the respondents their cost of preparing this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 16th day of May, 1960, one Pete
J. Buffo acting for and in behalf of Buffo Realty,
Inc., entered into a lease agreement with Motorola
Communication and Electronics Inc. for certain ra2

dio transmitting and receiving apparatus. The equipment was installed at 650 East 2100 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, by Utah Comunications Inc., respondent
herein, and Mr. Buffo commenced making the lease
payments. Subsequently the lease was assigned to
Motorola Finance Corporation and then to respondent Associates Finance, Inc.
In the early spring of 1964 the appellant negotiated with Mr. Buffo for the purchase of the aforementioned real property, said negotiations culminating
in the sale of the property on or about April 19, 1964.
Prior to the sale the appellant was informed by Mr.
Buffo that the radio equipment was acquired pursuant to a lease held by Associates. Appellant contacted Associates offering to take over the lease payments, but was informed that the lease could not be
tr an sferred to him and that he should contact the
Motorola Company with a purchase proposal (Exhibit 4-P). Evidently the suggestion was unacceptable to the appellant inasmuch as he made arrangements with Associates to pick up the equipment. A
representative of Associates, Mr. D. J. Bartnicki,
went to the appellant's premises in July of 1964, 'for
the purpose of removing the equipment. He removed
the radio base station and microphone which were
very accessible, being located in a street floor room.
Mr. Bartnicki went into the basement to observe the
"lead-in" cable and then went to the rear of the building to observe the tower and antenna. Mr. Bartnicki
was at that time dressed in a suit and therefore did
3

not feel inclined to remove the "lead-in" cable and
the antenna. He signed a receipt for the radio base
station and a "hold harmless" agreement prepared
by the appellant and left the premises.
Within two or three days thereafter the agents
of respondent, Utah Communications Inc., removed
the "lead-in" cable and the antenna. The uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Miller and Mr. Peters, the
agents of Utah Communications, was that the removal of the two items was easily accomplished without disturbing the premises.
In August of 1966, approximately one year after
the appellant had conveyed the premises to a subsequent purchaser, the appellant filed a complaint
against the respondents claiming conversion of the
"lead-in" cable and antenna, and also claiming a
trespass to his property.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
INDICATES THAT THE PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY CONVERTED WAS PERSONALTY AND
NOT A FIXTURE: THAT THE APPELLANT
WAS SUFFICIENTLY INFORMED OF THE
RESPONDENTS' INTEREST IN THE PERSONALTY TO PUT HIM ON NOTICE OF SUCH INTEREST, THEREFORE DISMISSING APPELLANT'S CLAIM TO BE A BONDA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE.

The apellant's claims are essentially two-fold:
4

( 1) That respondents converted his "lead-in" cable
and antenna, and (2) That respondents committed
a trespass to appellant's property in the process of
perpetuating the conversion. We shall first address
ourselves to the question of conversion.
The definition of conversion, almost universally
accepted, and found in Black's Law Dictionary,
Fourth Edition, 1957, is as follows:
"An unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or
personal chattels belonging to another, to the
alteration of their condition or the exclusion
of the owner's rights."
It is therefore imperative that the appellant
prove that he had an interest in the radio equipment
in order for him to recover for its conversion. Ownership of the equipment was however, retained by
Motorola pursuant to the lease agreement (Exhibit
2-d). The specific provisions contained in the lease,
reposing ownership in Motorola are found in paragraph ( 1) of the lease:
"Notwithstanding this lease by Motorola
to the Licensee the equipment and all replacement parts, additions, repairs and accessories
are and will remain the exclusive property of
Motorola and may be removed by Motorola in
accordance with the terms df this agreement
at any time. * * * the equipment will not be
considered for any purpose to be a part of
such land, vehicles or other places of installation and may be removed by Motorola in accordance with the terms of this agreement at
any time."
5

It would appear from the appellant's own testimony that he was endeavoring to establish his ownership interest in the radio equipment by showing
that the radio equipment had become so affixed to
the real property that it became a "fixture" and
hence part of the realty, and further that he was a
bona fide purchaser of the real property entitled to
the protection of that particular principle of law.

The radio equipment in question herein could
not be considered a fixture. The three-way test applied in determining whether an i tern is considered
a fixture was set forth by the Utah Supreme Court
in the case of Heiselt Construction Company v. Garff
et al, 119 Utah 164, 225 P.2d 720, (1950), and then
reaffirmed as the governing test in State Road Commission v. Papanikolas, 19 Utah 2d 153, 427 P.2d
749, ( 1967), where Justice Ellett's opinion for the
Court enumerated the following determinative factors:
" ( 1) Manner in which the i tern is attached or annexed to realty; (2) whether the item
is adaptable to the particular use of the realty;
and ( 3) the in ten ti on of the annex or to make
an item a permanent part of the realty."
The greater weight of evidence clearly shows
that the application of the "three-way" test to the
present facts would preclude the radio equipment
from the classification of a fixture. Mr. Bartnicki
said he observed the "lead-in" cable from the point
it entered the building to the point where it entered
the room containing the radio base station. He ob6

served that the cable "lyed (lay) on some crosspieces," indicating that the cable was placed on top
of the x-bracing between the floor joists. (R. 63, L.
17-18 and R. 67, L. 18-22). Mr. Miller, who installed
the cable and antenna and who believes he was present when it was removed, also confirmed Mr. Bratnicki's statements concerning the manner of attachment of the "lead-in" cable (R. 71, L. 22-23). Mr.
George Peters an employee of respondent Utah Communications present at the time of the removal of
the cable and antenna, could not recall the manner
of attachment of the cable, only that he pulled it from
the basement and that it did not take him very long
to do so. He also testified that he removed the antenna by climbing the tower, loosening the U-bolts that
clamped the antenna to the tower and lowered the
antenna to the ground. All of which took less than
20 minutes (R. 76 L. 3-27). There was no evidence
whatsoever eluding to the proposition that in removing the "lead-in" cable or antenna that any of the
realty was rendered any less operable, unsightly or
in any manner damaged. There were no indications
that the radio equipment was particularly adaptable
to the use of the appellant's property, vis-a-vis, similar commercial property. There was no testimony
to the effect that the real property was dependent
upon the radio equipment to sustain the primary valuation base of the property.
Finallly, the intention of the annexor is best
evidenced by the lease agreement between Motorola
7

and Mr. Buffo, (Exhibit 2-d). As stated previously
it was understood and agreed between the parties
that Motorola would retain ownership; that Buffo
would have the right to possession of the equipment
for 60 months; and that the equipment would not be
considered a part of the realty.
Whether or not the appellant's claim of ownership is premised upon the proposition that he was the
owner of the real property including all fixtures appurtenant thereto, or premised upon his understanding that he was purchasing all chattels connected
with the property, in order for the appellant to prevail against the respondents he must show that in
either case he was a bona fide purchaser for value.
A generally accepted definition of "bona fide
purchaser" is found in 55 Am. Jur. "Vendor and
Purchaser" §685 :
'''The parting with a valuable consideration for a conveyance is not in itself sufficient
to entitle a person to the protection accorded
bona fide purchasers, to be entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser, the purchase
must be made in good faith. A purchase with
notice is considered a purchase made mal.e fide,
and a purchaser with notice is not entitled to
protection as a bona fide purchaser, but takes
subject to outstanding interests, even though
he may have given full value. In
case, the
purchaser stands in the same position as the
one from whom he purchased." (P. 10671068).
The appellant's own testimony reveals that prior
8

to the transfer of the property to him, he was aware
of Associates' interests in the radio equpiment:
Hansen, was there ever anything
said between you and Mr. Buffo relative
to the radio station?"
A. "Very definitely."
Q. "What was the nature of that conversation?"
A. 'I asked Mr. Buffo what the status of the
radio station was. He said the base station and the microphone was owned in
with Associates, that the attached equipment belonged to the building, including
the antenna, the metal structure that
holds the antenna, all the lead-in up to
that point." (R. 47, L. 14-22)
Mr I Hanson immediately contacted Associates
inquiring as to the nature of the lease but was informed that the local office did not have a copy of the
lease at that time (R. 48, L. 16-23 and R. 51, L. 3-13).
The appellant, having knowledge that Associates had or claimed an interest in some of the radio
equipment, nevertheless acted upon the misrepresentation of Mr. Buffo and purchased the property. This
appellant did without waiting to secure a copy of the
lease from either Mr. Buffo or from Associates or
at least securing a waiver of interest to any equipment in question from Associates.
Mr. Bartnicki, the agent of Associates testified
that he had a conversation with the appellant prior
to entering the appellant's premises to remove the
Q.
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radio equipment. He explained that he picked up the
base station and would have taken the rest of the
equipment had he been able to.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.

"O.K. Well then, when you went in to get
the base station did you intend, would you
have taken the other stuff had you been
able to?"
"Yes."
"Where would you get that authority?
Where did you get that authority?"
"I tender this one answer. Why would I
need authority? It was Associates' property." (R. 65, L. 5-12).

The last statement sums up the evidence introduced at trial. It was Associates' property! Appellant
knew that Mr. Buffo was leasing the equipment from
Motorola and that Associates were handling the account. He endeavored to renegotiate the lease for his
benefit but when the negoteiations failed he agreed
that Associates could reclaim their property. It appears now, as it appeared years ago, that the appellant simply sued the wrong party. It appears that he
has suffered at the hands of Mr. Buffo.
A word should also be directed to the second portion of the "bona fide purchaser" definition. The only
evidence introduced by the appellant with reference
to the '"value" or compensation paid to Mr. Buffo
was the statement by the appellant that he purchased
it (the building and equipment) by trade with Mr.
Buffo. It would seem f arfetched to establish a prim a
10

f acie case as a bona fide purchaser for value on such
a self serving non-conclusive bit of evidence.
In a case similar to the present action the Utah
Supreme Court held that wall to wall carpeting that
was not affixed to the floor and where the parties
agreed pursuant to a conditional sale contract that
the carpet should remain personalty with the vendor
retaining title to the carpet would "dispose of plaintiff's third point as to their being bona fide purchasers for value." Dusenberry v. Taylor's, 7 Utah 2d
383, 325 P.2d 910 (1958).
POINT II
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH
ANY EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM
FOR DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE PURPORTED TRESPASS OF UTAH COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

The apellant has stated in his brief that the damages suffered by him as a result of the trespass of
Utah Communications, Inc. were "the value of the
property converted as stated in Point I." It would
therefore appear that the appellant's alleged damages were perpetuated by the conversion and not by
the trespass. The appellant presented absolutely no
evidence indicating any damages to his real or personal property at the tmie when Utah Communications entered his property to remove the ''lead-in"
cable and antenna. There was no evidence or force
used in gaining entery to appellant's premises nor
was there any evidence to indicate the use of exces11

sive force in removing the radio equpiment, precipitating damage to any permanent structure or chattel
owned by the appellant.
The Lower Court properly observed that if in
fact the respondent trespassed against the possessory
right of the appellant, that act was "not of such a wilful nature as to permit punitive damages." (R. 23).
This, again, is supported by the evidence and the fact
that such a claim for punitive or exemplary damages
is beyond the scope of the appellant's pleadings and
hence moot.
CONCLUSION
The ''lead-in" cable and the antenna were not
so attached to the realty as to become fixtures. It was
the express desire of the parties to the lease agreement that the equipment retain its identity as personalty. the appellant does not qualify as a bona fide
purchaser for value of the "lead-in" cable and antenna because he admits knowledge of respondent's
interest in the equipment; he admits he failed to take
steps to establish what interest the respondent had in
the equipment by obtaining a copy of the lease, and
the appellant failed to establish the fact that he had
paid "value" for the equipment.
Furthermore the appellant has separated into
two causes of action, essentially one cause of action
sounding in conversion and has totally failed to establish any evidence to support a recovery for trespass
- there was simply no damage.
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We would contend that the Lower Cour properly
weighed the evidence and applied the law in determining that the appellant had failed to sustain the
burden of proof necessary to establish any cause of
action and we therefore feel that the Lower Court's
judgment of dismissal should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GARY R. HOWE
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Defendants-Respondents
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